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THE PROBLEM OF BELIEF IN LITERATURE.
The writing of imaginative literature is a creative activity and a 
function of what Coleridge calls the “Esemplastiv Imagination” ; a unify­
ing process, creating a synthesis out of the welter of sense perceptions, 
associations, ideas, attitudes, volitions, and imaginative experiences of 
the human mind. As Shakespeare says, the poet gives to “airy nothing”, 
in the sense of vague and confused feelings and thoughts, “a local habi­
tation and a name”.
In the same sense, the understanding and the enjoyment of literature 
require a re-creative activity by the reader. By this I do not subscribe to 
an extreme relativistic theory which considers the literary work merely 
as a stimulus to stimulate the various readers to construct their own 
private versions of it. A work of art is, after all, autonomous, and should 
be considered as such. But no matter how much we respect the autonomy 
of the poem, that is, its right to an objective, and not merely a subjective 
or relative, existence, the fact remains that it does not “exist” for the 
reader who has not succeeded in understanding and in appreciating it. 
By understanding I mean grasping the paraphrasable content, whereas 
appreciation implies judgment of value, favourable or adverse.
This appreciation requires an imaginative contribution which con­
sists of re-creating the poem in the reader’s mind, and the greater the 
literature, the greater the intellectual and emotional effort required to 
effect this re-creation. It is a matter of “Einfiihlung”, empathy, which 
Pope has described as ..reading in the same spirit as that in which the 
author wrote”.
Training in literary appreciation is accordingly necessary because, 
no matter what imaginative endowment or natural sensibility the reader 
might possess, he has to acquire the art of appreciation by patient appli­
cation, and he has to combine practice in reading with experience of life. 
When a work of art is rejected as bad by a competent critic, it implies that 
he has not found it to be worth the imaginative contribution which as a 
result of practice plus intuitive empathy he is able to give to an object 
which is worth while.
No literature can avoid in some way or other expressing or betraying 
the writer’s attitude and opinions. And there is no reason why it should 
be otherwise. The very greatness and the value of literature derive from 
the fact that it deals with human affairs, either directly or as a projection 
of human attributes into the external world. In this sense Matthew Arnold 
was right in his definition of literature as “Criticism of Life”.
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The question now is: to what extent are we, as readers, in this 
re-creative responsiveness, in our judgment of value, affected by the 
opinions and the attitude to life implicitly of explicitly embodied in the 
literary work? Does, and should, disagreement with thee writer’s point 
of view adversely determine our judgment of the value of the work, and 
conversely, does agreement with that view facilitate responsiveness?
There is little difficulty with the admittedly fanciful element in what 
we might call “fairy-tale” literature— Grimm’s “Tales”, “Alice in Wonder­
land”, Shakespeare’s “Midsummer Night’s Dream”. Here the super­
natural element is accepted as mere fancy by what Coleridge has called 
the “willing suspension of disbelief”. The problem lies with literature 
which assumes that it will be taken seriously as far as direct or indirect 
expression of belief or attitude is concerned.
The eminent Cambridge critic, 1. A. Richards, now of Harvard, has 
given considerable attention to this problem of belief and the allied ques­
tion of poetic truth. In order to understand his view on this point, we 
have to see it in relation to two aspects of hs criticism.
First, the general aim of his criticism. He has felt himself called upon, 
in our scientific age with its sceptical attitude to spiritual matters, to re­
state and justify the claims of imaginative literature. His problem has 
accordingly been to justify the poetic use of language. Hence all his 
criticism centres round the question of “Meaning”. What is scientific 
“meaning”, and what is poetic “meaning”? This is the ever-recurring 
question in his critical writings.
Secondly, his philosophy of language. He says that there are two 
uses of language: at one pole the language of pure notation, such as 
mathematical symbols, where factual or logical communication is the 
main consideration. This is the language of “scientific” communication. 
To be distinguished from this, he postulates the emotive or evocative use 
of language, where the intention is, not factual or reasoned communi­
cation, but to stimulate to action, to evoke feelings or attitudes— such as, 
on a lower level, advertisements and propaganda, and, on a higher plane, 
religion and imaginative literature.
His theory of belief fits into this general theory of language. He 
maintains that in scientific matters, where the aim is factual or hypothetical 
communication, we are called upon to accept or reject the facts or hypo­
theses intellectually; ;that is, the idea of in intellectual belief or disbelief, 
implying intellectual or logical analysis. In the emotive use of language we 
have emotional acceptance or rejection, independent of intellectual 
scrunity.
306
This, then, is how he tries to solve the problem of belief. Imaginative 
literature, accordingly, is satisfying because only emotional belief is 
necessary, intellectual or logical belief being not required or invited.
Now Richards's theory is useful as an elementary distinction, especially 
for beginners, but it breaks down under more profound scrutiny, for the 
simple reason that it over-simplifies what is a very complex phenomenon. 
In the various forms of “emotive” language we cannot separate the func­
tions of the intellect and the emotions. The highest forms of religion and 
the finest poetry can stand the test of the intellect, and even in lower 
forms of emotive language, such as the propaganda swallowed by a gul­
lible public, some kind of intellectual element is present. We cannot divorce 
intellectual assent and emotional belief in such an over-simple way.
Strangely, T. S. Eliot, foremost poet and a particularly sensitive 
critic, also slips up on this matter of belief in literature. Writing, in his 
later criticism, with a thesis at the back of his mind— the justification ot 
his conversion to Roman Catholicism— he says of Shelley: “The reason 
why 1 was intoxicated by Shelley at the age of eleven, and now find him 
almost unreadable, is not so much that 1 accepted his ideas and have 
since come to reject them, as that at that age the question did not arise . . .
I can only regret that Shelley did not live to put his poetic gifts, which were 
of the first order, at the service of more tenable beliefs . . .”
Mr. Eliot misses the point. It is not the “untenableness’ of Shelley’s 
beliefs, it is the lack of thought and profundity. The trouble with Shelley 
is that he is essentially a poet for the immature mind in the “Sturm and 
Drang” phase of life— by reason of his exuberance, his wild imaginative 
flights, his irresponsible use of language. Unfortunately, his manner, his 
cocksure tone, invites logical scrunity, much to his detriment. It throws 
out a challenge to examine his thought, as, for instance, we do in the per­
fect fusion of thought and emotion in Shakespeare, whose manner Shelley 
so obviously imitates. And he fares very badly under such an examination.
This is what Eliot intuitively objects to: not the wrongness of Shelley’s 
thought, but his lack of it. (This crops up again when we consider the 
problem of sincerity. Shelley's weakness is that it is not sincere thought; 
it is a pose.) Eliot is right in his dislike of Shelley, but he is wrong in 
his theoretical justification of his aversion.
How, then, are we to solve the problem? Must we be satisfied with 
a purely relativistic, subjective theory of art?
1 think we can come to a satisfactory working conclusion, if, starting 
with literature we know, we ask ourselves, in a simple, practical way, what 
the function of the writer really is.
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In connection with this matter of poetic belief, I conducted a simple 
experiment in criticism with a class of third-year students. Starting with 
“Cry, the Beloved Country”, which raises the highly contentious question 
of the Native problem in South Africa, and in the discussion referring to 
such views as Shaw’s Life Force, Butler’s attack on religion, Milton’s 
Puritanism, Dante’s Catholicism, Auden’s communism, we tried induc­
tively to answer the question: What do we expect the writer to do in 
this matter of belief?
1 am here giving the suggestions, with the replies offered by students.
(1) The book expounds a wrong political theory, and has therefore 
done South Africa a lot of harm overseas.
Reply: That is altogether too crude a view. The reader cannot require 
the novel to conform to his own brand of politics. And, after all, who are 
we to judge?
(2) The book should give a reliable account of the social milieu 
which forms the background.
Reply: The writer is not a social researcher, who has to collect and 
interpret factual data.
(3) The writer is writing about the plight of the detribalised Natives. 
He should, then, make out a convincing case for them.
Reply: The writer is not an advocate, who has to make out a case for 
his clients.
(4) The writer should be constructive in the sense of offering a prac­
tical solution.
Reply: The writer is not a politician or a social reformer who has to 
find or profess to find “solutions”.
Finally, the following view was endorsed as most generally acceptable.
I am not offering it here as a complete poetic theory, but merely as a 
practical point of view which has proved of value to the students.
The writer is under no obligation to conform to our moral, political, 
or religious views. The test is rather whether he succeeds in presenting, 
as he has experienced it, some aspect of the human situation, directly or 
projected.
Before the Fall, Adam and Eve’s literature would have been unmixed 
songs of praise, as in the early part of “Paradise Lost” :
308
“................................................for in their looks divine
The image of their glorious Maker shone,
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude, severe and pure”.
Subsequently, after
“Man’s first disobedience......................... which
Brought death into the world, and all our woe”,
the human consciousness has forever been hovering between the 
opposite poles of Good and Evil. As Mrs. Gaskell said of Charlotte 
Brontë, every human soul is a “battle-field”, a scene of conflict. In this 
great human drama, with its despair and its aspirations, its humour and 
its poignant tragedies, we are all participants. Both the writer and the 
reader see as in a glass, darkly.
And what the reader is entitled to demand is that the writer should 
give, according to the light he has, an honest, sincere version of what 
he has experienced of life and its perplexities.
“So runs my dream;. ;but what am I?
An infant crying in the night;
An infant crying for the light;
And with no language but a cry.”
Humility, sincerity and human sympathy are the requisites for a good 
reader, as well as for a good writer.
This, then, is how poetic truth is accepted— not as factual information, 
not as logical verifiability, not as conforming to our view of life, not by 
philosophic reasoning, but by intuitive (Croce), imaginative (Coleridge), 
appreciative (Leavis) “Einfiihlung” of the sincerity of the presentment 
of the human situation as experienced, selected, and organised by the 
imagination of the writer.
I. J. FOURIE.
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BOEKBESPREKING.
Dr. W. J. Kooiman: Luther, zijn wen 
en werk; Uitgewerij W. Ten Have 
N.V., Amsterdam, 1954. Bis. 221; prys 
Í5.50.
Ons het die laaste tyd baie van die 
naam Luther gesien in ons koerante en 
dit dikwels hoor noem deur mense wat
geleentheid gehad het om die rolprent 
oor Luther te sien. By wat ons nou 
net genoem het, verskyn daar ook van 
tyd tot tyd boeke, selfs in Afrikaans, 
oor sy lewe. D it lyk dus waarlik of 
die naam Luther in die nabye toekoms 
meer tot sy reg sal kom as in die ver- 
lede.
